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Abstract 
A widely discussed issue in Internet voting is the secure platform problem: ensuring vote 
secrecy and/or vote integrity in the presence of compromised voting devices. A well-known 
approach to address this issue is code voting. Code voting systems differ regarding their 
security level: some ensure either vote secrecy or vote integrity, while others ensure both. 
However, these systems potentially impair usability, as voters have to enter and/or compare 
random codes, rather than just selecting their preferred candidate. This might negatively affect 
voters’ attitude towards the adoption of Internet voting. Therefore, it is important to determine to 
which extent voters would sacrifice usability for security. To determine this tradeoff between 
usability and security, we conducted a pilot user study among university students in the 
university elections setting, and a quantitative analysis. Our findings reveal that voters would 
sacrifice approximately 26 points (scale 0-100) of usability given a system with higher security. 
1 Introduction 
Due to the widespread usage of Internet technology, Internet voting has become a topic of 
extensive research. However, before Internet voting could be adopted on a large scale in 
practice, a number of challenges have to be addressed, such that the fundamental election 
principles (namely, general, free, secret, equal and direct vote for the elections in Europe1) are 
ensured. One of the most prevalent challenges is to ensure the security requirements of vote 
secrecy and vote integrity that are deduced from these elections principles2. The worldwide 
infection rates of personal computers above 33%3 makes it even more crucial to ensure vote 
secrecy and vote integrity in the presence of compromised voting devices (voters’ personal 
computers). This challenge is also known as the secure platform problem. 
 
Over the last years, the research community has proposed a number of possible solutions to the 
secure platform problem. Most of these solutions trace back to code voting approach, originally 
introduced by Chaum4. Generally, the idea behind code voting approaches is that election 
authorities provide voters with so called code sheets that are distributed via postal mail. In order 
to cast a vote, voters enter the voting code assigned to their preferred candidate and/or party. 
Upon receiving the voting code, election authorities acknowledge its receipt by sending to the 
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voters a so-called confirmation code. At this step voters are encouraged to compare the 
received confirmation code, displayed by their voting device, with the confirmation code on their 
code sheet. Given the fact that potentially compromised voting devices do neither know valid 
voting codes, other than the one entered by the voters, nor the relation between voting codes 
and candidates, both vote secrecy and vote integrity are ensured against such devices. 
Nevertheless, the security gains come at the cost of usability losses: Voters have to enter and 
compare random codes, rather than just selecting (clicking) their preferred candidate and/or 
party from a given list. The competition between security and usability is well-known, and both 
of these aspects are of fundamental importance to the acceptance of new voting technologies5. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, it remains unknown to which extent voters are ready to 
trade usability for security. Note that determining this trade-off has a very high practical 
relevance, as it would allow decision makers to identify the adequate Internet voting system with 
respect to their election setting. 
 
Consequently, the present work aims to close this gap. Thereby, we conducted a user study in 
the context of the university elections at Technische Universität Darmstadt, where three different 
voting systems were considered: One that is vulnerable to compromised voting devices (secure 
platform problem) and two code voting systems, which provide different levels of security. 23 
participants took part in the study. Participants were required to cast a vote by using all three 
systems. After casting their vote with each of the systems, participants filled in the system 
usability scale (SUS6) questionnaire. Then, participants were required to indicate which system 
they would prefer to use in the real university elections. Finally, in order to identify the trade-off 
between security and usability, i.e. to derive a quantitative model that describes how much 
usability voters are willing to sacrifice for using a system with higher security, we conducted a 
multinomial logit analysis. The rest of this work is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our 
methodology. In section 3 we present and discuss our findings. Last, but not least, section 4 
summarizes the findings of this work and provides future work directions. 
2 Methodology 
In the following we describe the context, the considered voting systems and the study design.  
2.1 Context 
The TU Darmstadt considers the introduction of Internet voting for the university elections. 
Given these circumstances, we decided to conduct the user study in the context of the 
university elections. We think that the findings of our study would be beneficial for the respective 
decision makers. University elections at TU Darmstadt are held annually and comprise four 
individual races, namely the department council, the student council, university assembly and 
student parliament. In the elections for the department and student council, voters can select up 




2.2 Voting Systems 
For the user study we developed three mock-up systems, which were developed according to 
the university’s corporate design. In the following we describe the vote casting process and 
discuss the security properties for each system. 
2.2.1 System A 
The vote casting process with System A is very simple and intuitive. The voter makes her 
choice by selecting her preferred candidate from the candidate list on the voting website.  
She then reviews and confirms her candidate choice, just like reviewing and confirming her 
purchase in the shopping basket. Finally, the voter receives a confirmation message that her 
vote has been successfully cast. 
  
While being simple in usage, System A fails to ensure vote secrecy and vote integrity in the 
presence of compromised voting devices. On the one hand, a compromised voting device could 
learn the voter’s candidate choice, i.e. violates vote secrecy. On the other hand, a compromised 
voting device could send a vote for another candidate or simply drop the vote, i.e. a violation of 
vote integrity. 
2.2.2 System B 
The vote casting process with System B is slightly different in comparison to system A. Prior to 
casting her vote, the voter receives a unique code sheet (i.e. having a unique code sheet ID), 
where a unique confirmation code is assigned to each candidate, see Figure 1. The 




Figure 1: A simplified depiction of a code sheet for System B. 
 
Analogously to System A, the voter casts her vote by selecting her preferred candidate from the 
candidate list, reviewing and confirming her choice. After casting her vote, the voter receives a 
confirmation message that her vote has been successfully cast. In addition, this message 
contains a confirmation code. The voter is encouraged to compare the received confirmation 
code with the confirmation code assigned to her chosen candidate on the code sheet. 
 
The deployment of confirmation codes enhances the security in comparison to System A. If a 
compromised voting device alters or drops the vote, the voter would detect such misbehaviour. 
Given the fact that confirmation codes are secretly shared among the voter and the voting 
authorities, a compromised device is not capable of obtaining the confirmation code expected 
by the voter. As such, as opposed to System A, vote integrity is protected in System B against a 
compromised voting device. A similar approach has also been used for the Norwegian 
parliamentary election7. Note, however, that a compromised voting device can still violate vote 
secrecy in System B by learning the voters’ input choice. 
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2.2.3 System C 
The third system, System C, further modifies the vote casting process. Similar to System B, the 
voters also get a unique code sheet. These code sheets, however, are constructed in a different 
way, namely they contain a unique voting code for each candidate, and a single confirmation 
code for the entire code sheet, see Figure 2. The voting and the confirmation codes are known 




Figure 2: A simplified depiction of a code sheet in System C.  
 
In order to cast a vote, the voter enters the voting code that is assigned to her prefered 
candidate on the code sheet. 
 
Analogously to System B, after casting her vote, the voter receives a confirmation message and 
a confirmation code, which she is required to compare with the confirmation code on her code 
sheet. 
The purpose of the voting codes is to enhance security, more specifically to ensure vote secrecy 
against a compromised voting device. As the link between candidates and voting codes is 
secretly shared among the voter and the voting authorities, the voting device does not learn 
anything about the voter’s choice by seeing entered voting codes. In combination with the use of 
confirmation codes, System C ensures vote secrecy and vote integrity in the presence of 
compromised voting device. A similar approach has been proposed by Ryan et al8 and by 
Budurushi et al9. 
 
 
2.3 Study Design 
2.3.1 Participants: Recruitment, Incentives and Sampling 
Participants were recruited by personal contact, e-mail and flyers. As we conducted the study in 
the context of the university elections, our participants were members of TU Darmstadt. No 
incentives were provided, thus participation was purely voluntary. In total twenty-three 
participants (11 female, 12 male), between the ages of 18-35 years, took part in the study. 
2.3.2 Study Procedure 
The study consisted of five parts. In the first part participants were introduced to the fictive 
research goal, namely to test the voting systems that are considered to be used for the next 
university elections. Next, participants were required to read and sign the consent form for 
participating in the study. Participants could leave the study at any point in time without 
providing a reason, however, all of the participants completed the study. Afterwards, participants 
were provided their login credentials. It is important to note that to ensure participants’ privacy, 
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we required them to vote by following a voting agenda, i.e. to vote for a pre-defined candidate 
and party. 
In the second part participants were provided with voting instructions for System A. After casting 
their votes by using System A, participants filled in the SUS (System Usability Scale) 
questionnaire6. Next, participants were introduced to one of the vulnerabilities of System A, 
namely that this system fails to ensure integrity of the vote in the presence of compromised 
voting devices, and that System B has been developed to address this vulnerability. In the third 
part participants were provided with voting instructions for System B. Further, they cast their 
vote by using System B and filled in the SUS questionnaire. Afterwards, participants were 
introduced to a security vulnerability common to both systems A and B, namely that a 
compromised voting device might violate vote secrecy. They were further told that System C 
addresses both vulnerabilities, namely the violation of vote secrecy and integrity. In the final part 
participants were provided with voting instructions for System C. After casting their vote by 
using System C, they were also required to fill in the SUS questionnaire. Last but not least, 
participants were asked to indicate and explain which of the three systems they would use for 
the next university elections. In the last part participants debriefing took place, i. e. participants 
were introduced to the actual goal of the study, namely, that the study aimed at evaluating the 
trade-off between usability and security that the participants were willing to make, and that none 
of the systems was actually considered for the university elections. 
3 Results and Discussion 
In this section we present and discuss the findings of our study as follows: We first consider the 
results with respect to the usability evaluation of each system. Then, we provide an overview 
regarding participants’ choice of their preferred system and summarize their arguments. Further, 
we evaluate the trade-off between usability and security that our participants were willing to 
make. 
3.1 Usability 
In order to assess the usability of each system we evaluated the SUS questionnaires according 
to the method described by Sauro10, presented in Figure 3. Our evaluation revealed a significant 
difference (both according to Wilcoxon signed rank test and one sample t-test11, p < .001) in the 
usability score between systems A and C, as well as between systems B and C. A less 
significant difference was identified between systems A and B (p = 0.063 for the Wilcoxon test, 
and p = 0.052 for the t-test). It is not surprising that usability score of System C was significantly 
lower than both System A and B, because to cast a vote with System C participants are 
required to enter a specific voting code, rather than just selecting their preferred candidate. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that the difference between System A and B was found to be less 
significant, even though they slightly differ in the vote casting process, namely in System B 
participants are required to compare the confirmation code. Last but not least, our findings might 
be slightly susceptible towards the learning effect due to the adopted study design. This means 





Figure 3: Average usability scores and their standard deviation for each one of the systems.  
 
3.2 System of Choice and Arguments 
Figure 4 depicts participants’ choice with respect to their preferred voting system. The findings 
presented in Figure 4 reveal that the majority of the participants, namely 15 out of 23, indicated 
System C as their choice of preference to cast a vote, even though it performed worst regarding 
usability. Thereby, when asked to explain why they would prefer this particular system via an 
open question in the questionnaire, the most mentioned argument by the participants was the 
higher level of security, 
 
“Due to the high security measures, throughout the election I feel more secure.” 
 
“I felt most secure when using the third voting systems, because there was a voting code and a 
confirmation code. Since names of candidates were not shown, eavesdropping my vote is made 
more complicated. At the same time, the use [of codes] remains simple, but for inexperienced 
users, not choosing the names might cause problems.” 
 
fig4 
Figure 4: Number of participants who chose each one of the systems.  
 
 
From the remaining participants, three chose to use System A and five chose to use System B. 
Thereby, the participants that chose System A mentioned that they are not concerned about the 
secrecy and integrity of their vote in the context of university elections, 
 
“...The university elections is not so important for me, if someone knows how I voted. I think that 
I would rather quickly cast my vote in such elections, and therefore the extra effort required by 
System B and C is unnecessary.”  
 
“...It’s the simplest and quickest to use. The security aspect is for me as a user not important. It 
should be secured in the background such that I am not directly involved.” 
 
Participants that chose system B mentioned that they are not concerned about vote secrecy, but 
rather integrity, 
 
“...Not unnecessarily complex, it does not matter who sees who voted for whom.” 
 
It is worth mentioning that one participant holds the opinion that increasing the complexity of the 




“... the multiple security layers suggest that the election is conducted correctly, because it does 
not only require simple clicking. But I did not understand what the confirmation code served for.”  
 
Note that these arguments might differ in other elections settings, for instance local or federal 
elections. 
3.3 Usability vs. Security 
In order to evaluate the trade-off between security and usability, we conducted a multinomial 
logit analysis (using mlogit package in R12), where we measured a relative impact of security 
and usability on participants’ preferences with respect to the choice of their preferred system. 
 
Based on the security requirements vote secrecy and vote integrity, we measured security on a 
scale from 0 to 2. System A, which protected neither one of these requirements, was assigned 
score 0. System B, which protected only one of them, was assigned score 1. System C, which 
protected both requirements, was assigned score 2. Furthermore, to measure usability we used 
the respective scores calculated in section 3.2, refer to Figure 3. 
 
Our analysis reveals that both security and usability were significant factors (with significance of 
p < .001 and p < .05 respectively) for choosing the preferred system.  
 
By calculating the relative coefficients of these factors, security and usability, it can be 
concluded, according to the model derived from our analysis, that voters would be ready to 
sacrifice on average approximately 26 points on usability (on a scale 0 to 100) for using a 
system which provides higher security. The finding suggests, that the voters would prefer 
System B to System A, as well as System C to System B, as long as the difference in usability 
scores is no more than approximately 26 points on usability. 
 
To illustrate this finding, consider when our study participants were ready to use a system with 
higher security and when not. For instance, refer to second column in Figure 5, participants who 
preferred System C (higher security) to B (lower security) evaluated C to be only 14 points less 
usable than B. On the contrary, participants who preferred System B to C evaluated C to be 32 




Figure 5: Perceived usability difference between preferred system and other voting systems. 
Voters choose more secure systems unless they perceive usability decreases above 





In this paper we report about the extent to which voters are ready to sacrifice usability for higher 
security assurances. We found out that voters prefer systems with higher security assurance, 
unless security gains come at the cost of more than approximately 26 usability points (scale 0-
100) on average. 
Note that as common for user study, our study is not free of limitations: The participants in our 
study were university members, and therefore not representative of the larger voting population. 
Furthermore, we focused on the secure platform problem, while Internet voting faces further 
security challenges, which include preventing voter coercion and implementing the principle of 
separation of duties. A further limitation of our study is that the usability scores that the 
participants gave were their perceived scores, probably biased by the study design (in 
particular, the learning effect). However, as the goal of the study was to find out the trade-off 
between security and usability as perceived by the participants, that they were ready to make, 
we consider the results of the study appropriate for this goal. 
While our findings provide important baseline data and novel directions on determining the 
trade-off between usability and security, further investigations are necessary to address the 
limitations of the reported study, and generalize our findings. 
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We include the raw data of SUS scores6 that resulted from our study. Note, that in some of the 
cases the participant's answer to a questionnaire item was ambiguous, hence, we included the 




























































































































































































































































































		 	A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	 A	 B	 C	
1	 5	 4	 3	 2	 4	 4	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1	 4	 4	 5	 3	 2	 2	 2	 5	 5	 3	 2	 1	 3	 5	 5	 3	 2	 1	 2	
2	 5	 5	 5	 1	 4	 4	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 4	 3	 3	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	
3	 5	 5	 5	 2	 4	 2	 5	 4	 3	 1	 1	 3	 4	 4	 5	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 3	 2	 2	 4	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	
4	 2	 4	 4	 3	 4	 3	 3	 4	 3	 3	 2	 5	 4	 4	 4	 2	 2	 2	 4	 4	 4	 2	 4	 3	 4	 4	 2	 2	 2	 4	
5	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 4	 4	 5	 4	 5	 1	 1	 3	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 4	
6	 3	 3	 3	 1	 1	 1	 5	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	
 
 10 
7	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 4	 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 3	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 4	 4	 5	 5	 1	 1	 3	
8	 4	 4	 4	 2	 2	 2	 4	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 4	 3	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	
9	 4	 4	 3	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 1	 5	 4	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 4	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 3	
10	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 2	
11	 4	 5	 3	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 2	 4	 4	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 4	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 1	
12	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	
13	 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 4	 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 3	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 4	
14	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 4	 1	 2	 3	 5	 5	 4	 2	 2	 2	 5	 5	 4	 1	 2	 2	 2	 5	 5	 1	 1	 2	
15	 4	 3	 3	 1	 3	 5	 5	 4	 3	 1	 5	 1	 4	 3	 2	 1	 2	 2	 4	 4	 5	 1	 4	 5	 2	 3	 3	 1	 4	 1	
16	 4	 2	 1	 2	 2	 1	 5	 2	 1	 1	 3	 5	 5	 1	 1	 4	 1	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 2	 5	 5	 4	 2	 1	 3	 2	
17	 2	 3	 3	 1	 2	 3	 5	 4	 3	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 3	 3	 3	 3	 1	 1	 2	
18	 3	 1	 3	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 3	 1	 1	 1	 4	 1	 5	 3	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 1	 4	 1	 1	 3	
19	 5	 5	 4	 1	 1	 2	 5	 4	 3	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 4	 1	 2	 1	 4	 4	 3	 1	 1	 3	 4	 4,5	 5	 2	 1	 2	
20	 4	 3	 3	 2	 4	 4	 4	 3	 2	 1	 1	 1	 4	 4	 4	 2	 2	 2	 4	 3	 3	 2	 4	 4	 3	 2	 2	 1	 2	 1	
21	 5	 5	 5	 1	 4	 4	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 1	 1	 5	 5	 5	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 4	 1	 1	 1	
22	 3	 5	 5	 2	 1	 2	 3	 3	 2	 1	 1	 1	 3	 3	 3	 2	 2	 2	 3	 3	 3	 3	 2	 3	 2	 4	 5	 1	 1	 2	





Oksana Kulyk (oksana.kulyk@secuso.org) is doctoral researcher at the Center for Research in 
Security and Privacy at Technische Universität Darmstadt. Her research focuses on secure, 
usable and verifiable electronic voting systems. She leads the research in the area of electronic 
voting in the research group Security, Usability, and Society (SECUSO). 
 
Stephan Neumann (stephan.neumann@secuso.org) is postdoctoral researcher at the Center for 
Research in Security and Privacy at Technische Universität Darmstadt. His research focuses on 
usable secure digital communication and the security of electronic voting systems. He is the 
area head of secure digital communication in the research group Security, Usability, and Society 
(SECUSO). 
 
Jurlind Budurushi (jurlind.budurushi@secuso.org) is postdoctoral researcher at the Center for 
Research in Security and Privacy at Technische Universität Darmstadt. His research focuses on 
security and privacy delegation, and the security of electronic voting systems. He is the area 
head of privacy in the research group Security, Usability, and Society (SECUSO). 
 
Melanie Volkamer (melanie.volkamer@secuso.org) is professor for Usable Privacy and Security 
at the University of Karlstad (Sweden) and professor (Kooperationsprofessor) at the Technische 
Universität Darmstadt. She is the head of the research group Security, Usability, and Society 
(SECUSO). 
